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Abstract 
Traditionally, family migration was conceptualized as a separate form of migration from labour migration. Increasingly socio-economic criteria (labour market participation, language compe- tence, financial resources, independence from welfare), have been applied to family migration policies in Europe, and are harder to fulfil by those with a weaker labour market position. Hence class now plays an increasingly significant role in stratifying the right to family migra- tion. The article examines the imposition of minimum income requirements in three countries – the Netherlands, Norway and the UK – and the significance of class in its economic and cul- tural dimensions in meeting the requirement. For those without sufficient economic capital to meet the requirement, cultural capital may facilitate the development of coping strategies to overcome or reduce the duration of family separation. Class is not the only stratifying element: gender, age and ethnicity interact with and reinforce the effects of class.  
Traditionally family migration was conceptualised as a separate form of migration 
divorced from labour migration which derived from economic imperatives. 
Increasingly however, socio-economic criteria such as labour market participation, 
language competence, financial resources and independence from welfare, have 
been applied to family migration policies in European states. These policies promote 
liberal notions of autonomy and self-responsibility (Ruffer 2011; Schinkel and van 
Houdt 2010) but are harder to fulfil by those with a weaker or unstable labour market 
position.  Women who are more likely to work part-time, earn less  (gender pay gap, 
segregated sectors) and have caring responsibilities, certain ethnic minorities, the 
less skilled and the young, especially at a time of high youth unemployment, are 
among those most likely to be affected.   
In national regulations, class has come to play an increasingly significant role 
in stratifying the right to family migration. Class facilitates or renders difficult 
transnational family life (Fresnoza-Flot and Shinozaki, 2016) through the outcomes of 
immigration policies in destination countries and the ability to live family life in one 
place rather than as an enforced transnational existence. Traditionally class had 
been theorized in relation to hierarchies and inequalities in relation to material 
resources, in particular position in the social division of labor and structures of 
wealth. After a period of questioning the relevance of class as a category of societal 
analysis, the recent revival of interest in class since the 1990s has embraced cultural 
dimensions such as consumption, cultural practices and bodily performance (Kelly, 
2012) and its intersections with other social divisions of gender and race (Anthias 
2005; Sirriyeh 2015). 
 In policy terms, a growing culturalization of economic deprivation and a 
conflation of economic and cultural characteristics have emerged in what Bonjour 
and Duyvendak 2017) term the ‘migrant with poor prospects’, often associated with 
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racialized migrant groups, such as Moroccans, South Asians and Turkish. These 
groups are frequently depicted as being likely to become dependent on the welfare 
state and unlikely to make good citizens or fit into a national community (Anderson, 
2013). Migrants are thus expected to demonstrate they are responsible for 
themselves and self-sufficient before they are bestowed with social citizenship Those 
on low incomes, with few resources and low levels of education have increasingly 
been excluded through restrictive immigration regulations in labor migration favouring 
the skilled as well as in international families (Sirriyeh 2015).  Other requirements, 
such as integration measures, including language tests, pre and post immigration, 
demand material resources and educational  qualifications. When language tests 
were first implemented, they had the effect of raising the educational level of spouses 
in Germany and  the Netherlands (Goodman 2011; Scholten et al. 2012). 
Of the economic criteria, a minimum income to be earned from the labour 
market has been prioritized.  Apart from being the easiest measure to verify by 
government officials, it reflects an appropriate work ethic (Chauvin et al. 2013), the 
capacity of the sponsor to be independent from the state and responsible for 
her/himself and the family (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). Savings above a certain 
amount can compensate for inadequate earnings but own income is not permitted in 
Norway. Assistance from other sources, such as the earnings of prospective spouses 
or third party support are also not permitted, as in Norway and the UK.  
At the same time the impact of restrictive conditions doesn’t necessarily map 
onto a simple division of class positions between working and middle class. 
Following Bourdieu (1987), whose conceptualization has been crucial to the 
rethinking of class transnationally (Erel, 2010; Kelly, 2012; van Hear, 2014; Weiss, 
2005), the combination of different capitals (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) 
has led to a much more nuanced appreciation of class (Wacquant, 2013). Economic 
capital relates to material wealth while cultural capital takes three forms (Bourdieu 
1986:48), namely embodied which comprises internalized cultural signals (attitudes, 
preferences, knowledge); objectified which manifests itself in material objects which 
acquires its worth only if the individual is in possession of the means of consuming 
them; and institutionalized which refers to academic qualifications.  What is 
significant for our analysis is that capitals are convertible ie.  economic capital 
facilitates the acquisition of  institutionalized  cultural capital and vice versa.  
His framework has also contributed to reconceptualising the fragmented 
nature of traditional  working and middle classes  and the emergence of new classes 
(Savage et al. 2013 for the UK), in part because class positions may combine 
economic, cultural and social capitals  in different proportions rather than be based 
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on occupational divisions alone.  Immigration policies seeking to restrict family 
migration have tended to emphasize economic criteria such as income. Thus those 
doing skilled working class jobs, such as electricians or plumbers, are more likely to 
be able to meet the income requirements than many in service occupations. On the 
other hand, some individuals from middle class backgrounds with low economic 
capital and insecure jobs but high cultural capital, for example young people with 
degrees, may form part of the precariat (Standing, 2011).   In this situation, some of 
them pursue global mobility in search of other opportunities and, in doing so, meet 
their future intimate partner.  Others move in order to circumvent or overcome the 
barriers preventing them living with their partners, and which may also be easier for 
those with cultural capital  (Wray et.al. forthcoming).  In this paper, I am particularly 
interested in the extent to which cultural capital in its various dimensions (education, 
cultural attitudes and practices) enables the individual and family members to 
navigate the immigration system. 
The article thus explores the class outcome of restrictive family migration 
policies based on economic criteria and the ways in which class, especially its 
cultural dimensions, are also likely to play a significant part in the ability of individuals 
and families to overcome the restrictions. The analysis will focus on three countries – 
the Netherlands, Norway and the UK- which have introduced minimum income 
regulations without permitting other resources to alleviate deficiencies in income of 
the sponsor.  In the space of this article it is not possible to examine in depth the 
impact of other measures such as language and knowledge tests and their 
implications for the ability of entry, obtaining permanent residence and citizenship. 
Within this comparative perspective, I pay particular attention to the UK where 
there have been a number of academic and policy publications, media reports and 
activist organisations have drawn attention to the discriminatory implications of the 
minimum income regulations and the strategies adopted to overcome these effects, 
such as exercising free movement rights by moving to another European state. In 
this case the imposition of a minimum income has affected a larger number of 
citizens in the UK, often with no migrant background, than in the other countries, 
either because the income required is lower or there are more exceptions.  In 
Norway, for example  students, citizens returning from abroad are exempt from the 
income requirement. In the UK there is a great deal more information about the 
experiences of families affected by the minimum income rule due to the harshness of 
the rule, very few exemptions (those on disability benefits, full-time carers allowance) 
and activism.  In Denmark there are a number of studies (Fernandez and Jensen, 
2014; Rytter, 2011; Wagner 2015) concerning the strategies adopted to circumvent 
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immigration regulations by moving to a neighbouring Sweden. However I have not 
included Denmark in the comparison because it is less a stipulated income level than 
criteria on minimum age of marriage, cousin marriage and attachment to the country 
which pose the most severe impediments.  In terms of economic resources, it is as 
likely to be the bank guarantee  which poses the greatest problem. 
The first section discusses the shift away from a purely social 
conceptualisation of family migration to the incorporation of economic imperatives 
and links to labour market participation or what has been termed an economic drift 
(Staver 2015) in a number of European countries in the past 15 years. In the second 
section I turn to a more detailed examination of the introduction of the minimum 
income requirement and its effects on marriage migration in three countries that have 
imposed the harshest measures -the Netherlands, Norway and the UK.  Its 
discriminatory impact is not limited to class but is found to produce a differential 
outcome in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and geographical location.  
 
 
From A Social Understanding to Economic Imperative 
 
Family migration, as a dependent and largely feminized flow, was associated with the 
social realm. It was seen as facilitating the integration of migrants as well as 
stemming from normative principles.  Indeed male marriage migrants, aroused 
suspicion on grounds that they were using this form of entry as a covert form of 
economic migration and a means of entering the labor market which was deemed to 
be their primary aim (Wray 2006). In some European countries access to the labour 
market was denied or restricted for family migrants. In different ways male and 
female family migrants were thus seen as posing a threat to indigenous workers and 
using this means of entry to circumvent restrictions on economic migration.   
Attitudes and practices towards spousal participation in the labour market, 
though not new, have changed considerably in the past few decades as part of the 
changing conceptualization of the family. Van Walsum (2012:6) notes the shift from 
the ‘conception of the heteronormative, marriage-centred and patriarchal family’, and 
one might add the male breadwinner model, ‘to a focus on the   autonomous 
individual who is sexually emancipated, gender neutral and self supporting’.   In 
relation to the modern couple and intimacy, it is the pure relationship (entered into for 
its own sake with partners being emotionally involved, and pursuing gender equality 
and sexual pleasure) which is set up as the ideal (Eggebø 2013; Giddens 1992).  
Family migration policies increasingly reflect the dominance of the ideal of romantic 
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love between autonomous individuals emblematic of Northern centric civility (Mai and 
King 2009). So ‘whilst family life has become increasingly a matter of individual 
responsibility, it requires monitoring by a tutorial state’ (van Walsum 2012:6), 
especially for families with a migrant background. The migrant family is represented 
as inimical to modern values and problematic for integration and the reproduction of 
worthy citizens.  
Initially, in the 1990s, interventions in couple formation and family migration 
were directed towards the entry of spouses. They stemmed from concerns about 
forced marriage (Kofman et al. 2015), which in many countries led to increases in the 
minimum age of marriage for sponsors and spouses and the introduction of pre-entry 
language tests (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK). In Norway, forced 
marriages, which were hotly debated, was one of the two areas of focus in the 
Immigration Act Commission of 2004, and led to the call to regulate marriages of 
second generation immigrants from Pakistan and Turkey (Staver  2013). Raising the 
age of marriage was scrapped in 2007 and instead the solution of a high income 
requirement which would force sponsors to be independent was imposed (Eggebø 
2010; Staver 2015). A second argument for intervention was failing and unwilling 
integration, reflecting a shift in attitudes from rights to duties and obligations of active 
citizens. Especially in Nordic states, female spouses are often deemed to be 
unwilling to play their part as workers and embrace gender equality required of good 
citizens.  The emphasis on emancipation and independence, which is to be achieved 
through the labour market, remains strong (Eggbø, 2010). A satisfying family life is 
based on women working and independently earning their own income (Cochran 
Bech et al. 2017). In the Netherlands too civic integration has come to be defined 
increasingly in terms of paid labour (van Walsum 2012: 8), and consequently family 
migration policies have developed according to the ability to earn a sufficient income 
at a level not to require any support from the state.. The welfare cost of family 
migrants has also become a polemical issue in the development of restrictive policies 
to cut the number of family migrants, especially those on low incomes often assumed 
to be primarily from ethnic minorities (Denmark, the Netherlands, UK). 
In the past two decades, family migration has become much more restrictive 
in relation to the resources demanded of both citizen and permanent resident 
sponsors and migrant spouses for entry and subsequent integration in order to 
eliminate those with poor prospects (Bonjour and Duyvendak 2017 for the 
Netherlands).  Whilst minimum resource requirements for entry have existed for 
some time, many states have raised the minimum level of income and more clearly 
stipulated the conditions to attain it. Thus many major countries of immigration in 
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Northern Europe have introduced fixed minimum incomes for sponsors (EMN 2017). 
Austria raised its level in 2009 from equivalent to social assistance to the higher one 
of minimum pension (Kraler et al. 2013). Belgium imposed a minimum level in April 
2011 with policies similar to the Dutch. Sweden did so in 2010 after it had radically 
opened its immigration to labour migrants of different skill levels. An exception is 
Germany where the income level constitutes a reference point rather than a fixed 
threshold (Pascouau et al. 2011). Although the Danish have not set a minimum 
income, the combination of minimum housing standards per inhabitant and bank 
guarantees, constitute a substantial economic threshold with the purpose of 
enforcing a continuing commitment to participation in the labour market which has 
had a particularly strong impact on female sponsors.  
Furthermore, the ways in which the financial resources could be provided 
have also been restricted. Previously, in countries such as Norway and the UK, the 
family as a whole could support the couple, but recent developments in the 
determination of eligible resources  put the onus on the individual  who alone must 
demonstrate her/his ability to participate in the labour market and support their future 
spouse. This withdraws more collective forms of support. In the UK,  income can only 
be generated by the sponsor and not the prospective earnings of the overseas 
spouse. France represents an exception in allowing both partners to make up the 
required income (Pascouau et a. 2011).  
In this paper, I argue that the imposition of income requirements at stipulated 
levels represents the transposition of economic criteria normally associated with 
labour migration. This serves to stratify the population that is able and worthy of 
family reunification and formation with a non-EU citizen. On the one hand, skilled 
migrants may be exempt from some of the requirements, such as knowledge of the 
language, as in the Netherlands, on the other, these regulations increasingly extend 
to citizens in order to encompass those of minority backgrounds who are considered 
to be too attached to their co-ethnics in their country of origin or who are 
economically in a weak or precarious position.   
Though not examined in this paper the other demands made upon spouses to 
qualify for entry, in particular the pre-entry language tests or integration at the border 
(Scholten et al. 2012), also demand economic resources and are generally designed 
to filter out the economically weak and those with lower levels of cultural capital, 
especially education, who are deemed less able to fit into the society of destination 
(Block 2015, Bonjour and Duyvendak 2017; Bonjour and Kraler 2014, Kofman et al. 
2015). As family migration has become highly politicised, more attention has turned 
to spouses (higher age of marriage and pre-entry tests) with countries either seeking 
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to sharply reduce the overall number of family migrants and/or change the profile 
away from those they do not want to those they do ie, from an immigration subie to 
an immigration choisie. Van Kerckem et al. (2013) suggest that European 
governments have been fixated with transnational marriages by minority ethnic 
groups, especially those from Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Pakistan and 
Turkey.  Yet there is evidence that global mobility of Europeans moving beyond the 
EU and non-EU citizens spending time in the EU has led to an expansion of the field 
of intimate relations and partnerships (Wagner 2015).  For example in the UK, 
partner visas cover a great diversity of nationalities and reflect a range of situations, 
well beyond the stereotypical transnational marriage between minority ethnic groups. 
Although 52% of those granted settlement as a result of family permits in 2008 came 
from 10 countries, including the USA, South Africa, China and the Philippines in 
addition to the traditional source of South Asian countries, the other half covers a 
very wide range of nationalities (Charsley et al. 2012; Home Office 2011).  
 In the next section I examine the different ways in which economic criteria, 
especially minimum income, have now increasingly been applied to sponsors in three 
European countries in addition to restrictions on spouses and the class impact of 
these measures. Class matters not only in relation to the immediate effect of the 
regulation but also to cultural capital, especially educational qualifications, that may 
contribute to the development of coping strategies to eventually meet the 
requirement and  reduce the duration of family separation.  
 
 
Income Requirements  and Class Outcomes  
 
The Netherlands  
Income requirements had been increasing steadily in the 1990s at a time when 
multicultural policies were also being questioned. In 2004, an income of 120% of 
minimum full-time wage (about €18,200 per year before taxes), with a stable contract 
of at least one year or three years earnings at that level, was imposed on those aged 
23 years and above who wished to bring in a family member. This level was chosen 
on the grounds that new migrants should not become a burden on the public purse 
and fixed at that at which the individual no longer had the right  to welfare provided 
by local authorities.  The level of minimum income was designed to reduce family 
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formation by 45%, in particular amongst Moroccan and Turkish Dutch (Leerkes and 
Kulu-Glasgow 2011).  
At the time of implementation, about a third of workers, including those 
working part time, did not earn 120% of minimum income (the level for family 
formation) whilst another 300,000 were on welfare. The reduction in actual numbers 
granted admission from 2004 to 2009 was higher (49%) amongst females compared 
to males generally (32%). In terms of age, it was over 50% for those between 21 and 
28 years compared to those over 28 years (33%). Marriage with overseas partners 
dropped by 37% overall but by 55% for Turkish Dutch and 53% for Moroccan Dutch. 
For those with Western nationalities it also dropped by 38% and for native Dutch by 
25% (Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow 2011: 111), hence indicating a lesser impact for 
non-ethnic Dutch.  When one combines ethnicity and gender, the fall was particularly 
striking for female sponsors of Turkish background whose successful applications 
declined by 57% compared to Dutch-born males sponsors with 22%.  
A study (Kulu-Glasgow and Leerkes 2013) of Turkish applicants, who had 
difficulties in initially meeting the income requirement, found that amongst the 50 
interviewees, those with higher educational levels, were more likely to be able to 
negotiate higher salaries or to find better paid employment. Those with lesser cultural 
capital tended to rely on social networks and social capital within the Turkish 
community to try to make up the deficit by obtaining jobs or getting employers to 
increase their wages on paper.  
Although the income requirement has been maintained, the level of 120% 
was considered unlawful by the European Court of Justice in 2010. This was 
because, among other things, “measures concerning family reunification should be 
adopted in conformity with the obligation to protect the family and respect family life 
enshrined in many instruments of international law” (Case C-578 Chakroun v Minister 
van Buitenlandse Zake 4 March 2010, line 44) and that the level had to be treated as 
a reference point allowing for an individual decision rather than as a hard and fast 
threshold. Following the decision, the Minister of Justice decided that an income 
requirement of 100% would now be applied to all new applications, including those of 
Dutch citizens 
Norway  
From 2004 and 2010 Norwegian immigration policy was reshaped in response to two 
categories of concern in terms of family migration.  The first were asylum seekers for 
which liberal family migration regulations might be seen as a pull  factor.  The second 
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were young citizens of minority background at risk of forced marriage, both of which, 
had been raised in the report of the Immigration Commission in 2004. For refugees 
the distinction was made between those wishing to bring in existing family members 
(reunification) and those seeking to  bring in new family members (formation) in 
which case they would have had to have worked or studied for 4 years (IMO 2013). 
There was an attempt to raise the age of marriage to 21 years, supposedly as a 
preventive measure against forced marriage but this was dropped in 2007.  However, 
young citizens and those with international protection only represented a minority of 
family migration (Staver 2015). The income requirement was thus multi purpose and 
aimed at addressing issues of adequate financial support, integration, forced 
marriage and higher asylum flows. Skilled workers, a group to be encouraged, were 
exempt from the income requirement. 
The old regulations had contained a subsistence requirement  which could be 
made up of both partners’ income. The new regulations, passed in 2008, and which 
came into force in January 2010, raised the income requirement considerably and. 
only counted the sponsor’s income.  The sponsor has to demonstrate they are 
earning a designated level of income, have earned the relevant amount for the past 
year and will most likely continue to earn it the next year. There is no minimum wage 
in Norway. The level of income is calculated on the basis of 88% of grade 19 of a 
civil servant salary (IMO 2013: 15). As of 2014, sponsors had to show an income of  
NOK 251,856  and demonstrate that they earned NOK 246,136 in 2013 (about 
€31,000). It was raised to grade 24 in the state salary scale which, as of 1 May 2015, 
amounted to an income of NOK 307 600 per year (about €32,546) but as of 2017 has 
been brought down again to the old level (Gustafsson Gronningsaeter and Brekke 
2017). In addition applicants have to demonstrate they have suitable housing and 
that they haven’t received social assistance in the past year.  
Rejections of applications in 2010 increased by six percentage points 
compared with the year before. In 2011, almost all applications were processed in 
accordance with the new Act, and rejections of applications rose by a further 2% to 
30% The most important reason for rejecting applications was the income 
requirement. However, skilled workers (as well as students, Norwegians returning 
from work abroad, and pensioners) are exempt from the requirement of 
demonstrating the previous year’s income, hence an acceptance rate of 99% for 
skilled workers in 2012 compared to 68% for citizens, residents and refugees  (UDI 
2012) with higher rates of rejection for female applicants (Staver 2015).  
Thus the impact of the new regulations has been uneven. Family-related 
immigration represented 32% of the non-Nordic immigration to Norway in 2012, 2% 
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higher than the previous year. The total number of new family related permits given 
to third-country nationals decreased slightly from 12 900 in 2011 to 12 500 in 2012. 
Criticisms on grounds of gender inequality were made (an increase in gender 
difference in acceptance rate which, by 2011, was 60% for women and 79% for 
men), but, except for an easing of conditions for Norwegians who had worked 
abroad, including women who had not worked whilst abroad or those who had been 
students, further changes have not been made (Cochran Bech et al. 2017).  
 
The UK  
The UK has passed legislation on all three major measures  (age of marriage, pre-
entry integration tests, minimum income) in an attempt to  reduce and change the 
composition of marriage migration. The previous Labour government had raised the 
age of entry and sponsorship from 18 to 21 years and planned pre-entry tests which 
were implemented from 29 November 2011 by the Conservative-led Coalition 
government. That government also raised the minimum income substantially to 
£18,600 pa (approximately 140% of the minimum wage at the time), making it one of 
the highest income levels in the world (Huddleston 2012). The Migration Advisory 
Committee (2011) had calculated that this was the level at which a couple would not 
qualify for any income-related benefits. 
The Home Office Policy Equality Statement on Family Migration (2012) 
identified the government’s aims as being to safeguard the economic well-being of 
the UK by reducing the burden on the taxpayer: “ … those who choose to establish 
their family life in the UK by sponsoring a non-EU partner to settle here should have 
sufficient financial independence to be able to support themselves and their partner 
without relying on public funds”. The justification of preventing a burden on welfare 
expenditure dominates the rationale for tightening the conditions of family migration. 
Compared to the other two measures, the income requirement introduced on 
9 July 2012 has had  the greatest impact on numbers, composition and the groups 
affected by it. A study in Scotland showed that 90% of those who had encountered 
problems with bringing in their spouse said it was due to the minimum income 
requirement (Baillot and Brady 2016). As in other countries. there had previously 
been a subsistence level  based on the net income of the sponsor and the non-EU 
spouse which, after the deduction of housing costs, had to be at least the equivalent 
of  Income Support  (£5500 per year excluding housing costs which vary according to 
location). Various sources of income could previously have been used as evidence of  
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means of support, including, after a lengthy court battle, those obtained from family 
members. The new regulations exclude any prospective income the spouse may 
earn or third party support towards making up any shortfall in income. Non-cash 
resources, such as housing, do not count. The income requirement is based on 
stable and continuous income for a 6-month period, thereby rendering it more difficult 
to attain for those without regular jobs and the self employed whose income may 
vary considerably and has to be earned over a year. Whilst savings  can make up for 
the shortfall, it has to be held for 6 months and only counts for savings above 
£16,000. 
The Migration Advisory Committee (2011) estimated that 45% of those who 
had qualified for sponsorship under the old regulations would not do so under the 
new ones. The Migration Observatory (2012) calculated that 47% of British citizens in 
employment would not qualify and it would fall unequally across different groups. 
Women, young people between 20 and 30 years, certain minority ethnic groups, 
especially Bangladeshi and Pakistani, and those living outside of London and the 
South East, would be disproportionately affected.  Though acknowledging that some 
groups would be disadvantaged disproportionately the government sought to justify it 
in economic terms and to claim that, despite it being discriminatory, its measures 
were proportionate to its aims. 
The refusal rate for non-EEA partner entry clearance rose from 19% in the 
first quarter of 2012 to 46% in the fourth quarter of the same year and from 10% to 
18% for those applying in the UK. The number of non-EU partner visas granted fell 
from 32,764 in the year ending September 2012 to 24,655 in the year ending 
September 2013, ie. a decrease of 25%. Apart from the drop in applications and 
increase in rejections, especially in the period immediately after the introduction of 
the minimum income rule, there is considerable evidence of the impact on the lives of 
specific families collected by parliamentary enquiries (APPG 2013), background 
papers to legal challenges in the courts (Wray and Kofman 2014), media reports, a 
survey by an association set up in 2012 to campaign against the rule (Britcits 2013)  
and research commissioned by the Office of the Children’s Commissioner on the 
impact on families with children (Middlesex University and JCWI 2015). The survey 
by Britcits estimated about a quarter of affected families had children.  
The OCC report, which included a survey of 100 families (58 female and 42 
male sponsors) with children affected in different ways by the minimum income rules, 
demonstrated that although it was hitting low income families, the rigidity of the 
criteria meant that it also encompassed a number of middle class families.  The 
educational attainment of the sample was high with 66 having an undergraduate or 
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masters degree but only a third were employed permanently and full-time. Amongst 
the low income were those working in poorly paid jobs, such as nursery assistants, 
cleaners, shop workers, driving instructors, and women with child care 
responsibilities on benefits. In some instances women had earned the stipulated 
income before having a child but as de facto single parents could not do so without a 
partner or parents to help them to be able to work sufficient hours to meet the 
minimum income. 
 Middle class families were entrapped because they either worked in jobs in 
the Global South that did not convert to the British income in pounds or the British 
citizen, though living in a well off household with a male breadwinner, was looking 
after children and not working.  Unlike in Norway, returning British do not have an 
exemption from the rule.  Many of the spouses of British citizens living abroad were 
well educated with 48 having at least an undergraduate degree and were in 
occupations such as landscape gardener, IT administrator, academic, accountant, 
and chef. Some had UK higher education degrees and would have been able to 
obtain employment quite rapidly.   
Nonetheless, middle class families had more economic and cultural capital 
that enabled them to work strategically around the minimum income and its rigid 
conditions.  Hence, although the sponsor resident in the UK might not be able to 
bring in a spouse immediately, there was a greater possibility for family separation to 
be temporary rather than long-term or permanent. Their means of fulfilling the 
required income level could involve converting fixed assets into cash, such as selling 
a house, to make up for inadequate earned income. For those abroad in professional 
jobs it meant returning to the UK without the spouse and children in order to search 
for a job with the right amount of remuneration and work for the stipulated 6 months 
before applying to bring in family members. An example was a development worker 
in the health sector who returned to the UK from a South Asian country and quickly 
found employment in the UK.  
Another strategy used by those with some flexibility was exercising their free 
movement rights. We do not know how common this strategy has been in the 
European Union, but it has happened extensively in Denmark with an estimated 2-
3000 people who have moved to Sweden due primarily to the attachment criteria  
and minimum age of marriage (Fernandez and Jenner, 2014; Rytter 2012; Wagner 
2015). Though the UK government has not provided any data, since 2012 there 
appear to be more couples using the Surinder Singh route, or transfer of residence to 
another EU country, in order to live with spouses (Wray et al. forthcoming). Under 
this principle, those who exercise free movement rights in another state, may be 
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accompanied by their family member on their return to the state of their nationality 
(Surinder Singh (C-370/90) [1992] ECR I-4265). They have been required since 2014 
by the UK government, which adopted the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 (SI No 3032) to show that  “the centre of [the 
British citizen]’s life has transferred to the EEA State where [the British citizen] 
resided as a worker or self-employed person” for a period of at least 3 months, 
though longer makes it more convincing.  Under EU law (EC Directive 2004/38, of 
the European Parliament and Council on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, there is 
no income threshold; the individual simply has to be able to provide economically for 
the family and not be a burden on the  state. It is also often a cheaper solution to 
avoid the very high application fees in the UK or payment of a bank guarantee in 
Denmark. 
 In a small study of 20 couples who had either considered or used the route 
(Wray et. al. forthcoming), the level of education or institutional cultural capital was 
very high. Couples were contemplating or had moved to another EU country because 
they couldn’t meet the financial threshold, either if in the UK or outside, and it would 
cost them too much, cause a lot of stress and mean being separated. In some 
instances, it was difficult living in the spouse’s country (Bangladesh, China, Cuba).  
Many stated they liked travelling and it was exciting living in another country while 
some could develop a career at the same time. The couples were relatively young – 
eight couples were both under 30 years, 17 of the UK citizens had an undergraduate 
degree while 4 had or were completing a PhD.  In terms of employment, some were 
studying part-time or working online.  One of the main difficulties of moving to 
another EU country was the need for flexibility so it is most advantageous for those 
with financial resources, often from parents (which could not be used towards the UK 
minimum income requirement), but were not anchored down by children, especially 
school age ones, and could mobilise social and cultural capital. Some, who had 
acquired another EU citizenship, had little intention of returning permanently to the 
UK but wanted to be able to live transnationally if they so desired.  In addition, two of 
the people interviewed (one contemplating, the other undertaking it) had parents they 
wanted to bring to the UK, but the degree of care required under the Adult 
Dependents Rule (July 2012) to bring their parent(s) to the UK has become so 
intense that virtually no parents would qualify (JCWI 2014). In this case, money 
couldn’t buy the right of entry even if no use is made of health and welfare services.  
In relation to the minimum income requirement, the legal challenge has   
moved through all the judicial levels from the High Court to the Supreme Court  (MM 
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& Ors vs SSHD (2017) UKSC)  which upheld the requirement on 22 February 2017. 
Nonetheless the Supreme Court declared the Family Migration Rules were unlawful 
because they did not give primary consideration to the best interests of children and 
that they should therefore be rewritten to take children’s welfare into account (see 
Middlesex University and JCWI 2015).  It also recommended that other reliable 
sources of earnings or finance should not necessarily be precluded where 
circumstances give rise to a positive ECHR article 8 duty.  Where children are not 
involved, taking account of these other reliable resources is likely to have a class 
dimension. Spouses are more likely to demonstrate they will be able to obtain a 
reliable job if they have a profession or a skilled trade. Third party support may be 
accessed from well off parents although its also available in migrant communities in 
which resources circulate among kin.   Nevertheless, making a convincing case for 
the availability of additional resources is more likely to succeed with legal advice. 
Given that in the UK there is no longer any legal aid, doing so also involves 
resources.  
 
Conclusion  
Initially more restrictive conditions for marriage migrants were justified on cultural 
grounds (e.g. forced and arranged marriages, lack of gender equality) pertaining to 
particular minority ethnic groups who were also often in a weak economic position. 
Female migrants from these groups could be shown to have a weak attachment to 
the labour market and therefore, especially in Nordic countries and the Netherlands, 
did not sufficiently live up to what constituted a good citizen who, in turn, would not 
reproduce productive citizens.  As the financial crisis has deepened, economic 
arguments in terms of labour market participation and burden on the welfare state, 
and thus the need for financial independence, have come ever more to the fore.  
The transference of economic criteria normally associated with labour 
migration to family migration moves this entry route away from a debate about the 
human rights of citizens and their migrant family members (Schrover and Moloney 
2013). Minimum income requirements are not just multi purpose in their objectives  
(financial independence, integration) but they target both citizens and non citizens 
who are economically poorly remunerated through the labour market and deemed 
not to deserve to benefit from the right to bring their family members into the national 
community.  In doing so, class has become the main determinant of access to family 
migration. 
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It is likely that the fixed minimum income is here to stay as a central 
requirement in those countries which have already introduced it. Legal challenges to 
this policy have only had partial success. The Chakroun case forced the Dutch 
government to reduce the minimum income to 100% for family formation. In Norway 
despite concerns about ‘unintended consequences’ and gender discrimination in the 
implementation of the income requirement, little change has ensued, and with the 
new right-wing government is unlikely to happen.  In the UK the Supreme Court 
upheld the right of the State to impose a minimum income requirement despite any 
hardships it has caused.  The major modification has been where children are 
involved and recommendations for a softening in the ways in which the income could 
be met. It should be noted that the Netherlands is bound by the Family Reunification 
Directive 2003/86/EC which is applicable to Third Country nationals unlike Norway 
and the UK. The Directive stipulates that, whilst a margin of appreciation is permitted, 
conditions should not undermine the objective of the Directive to promote family 
reunification and that each case should be individually examined. In the case of the 
Netherlands, the Directive also now applies to Dutch citizens (EMN 2017). 
The turn towards economic drivers in the regulation of family migration 
contradicts what should, in a moral sense, underpin policy: the facilitation of intimate 
relationships by citizens and residents where these involve cross-border movement, 
except in clear cases of harm to the wider society. Rather it is economic membership  
of a society and class status which prevails and in which ‘money buys a better class 
of citizenship’ (Williams 2014). In all the countries discussed in this paper, policy 
restrictions have been justified by the need to ensure labour market participation, to 
protect the welfare budget and engender responsible and independent citizens. The 
result has been a substantial reduction in the number of successful applications.  
The right to family life has been subordinated to instrumental calculations 
about the economic contribution migrants may make and their supposed burden on 
welfare expenditure. Less prosperous citizens and denizens without sufficient 
economic capital are increasingly excluded by national laws from determining how 
they live their family life.  However those with cultural capital, such as students or 
skilled workers, may be exempt from having to demonstrate prior earnings, as in 
Norway.  For the many who are not exempt, cultural capital may facilitate the search 
for better and more stable employment.   Others are more likely to turn to remedies 
available in international law, such as EU free movement, to counteract the strictures 
of national regulations.   
Although the different dimensions of class significantly stratify experiences of 
family migration and the impact of these regulations, so too do other social divisions 
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play a part in conjunction with class. Gender has been shown to be a significant 
aspect of stratification  in family migration policies, especially of spouses in relation to 
dependency and labour market integration (Kraler 2010; Kraler and Bonizzoni 2010), 
As I have indicated throughout the article,  gender in particular contributes to the 
unequal outcomes produced by minimum income regulations in this case in relation 
to female sponsors. It is largely due to the economic inequalities experienced by 
women in the labour market, such as the gender pay gap and caring responsibilities 
for children and parents. In the Netherlands, evidence shows how gender intersects 
with ethnicity to produce discriminatory outcomes in the application of the minimum 
income requirement.  However this does not mean majority ethnic  women and (men) 
are not affected by it, as the large number of white British citizens forced to live 
transnational family lives, confirms. 
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